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WATER RIGHTS

Federal liability for state water-adjudication filing fees:
Has the United States waived its sovereign immunity?
by Robert H. Abrams

United States
v,

State of Idaho
(Docket No. 92-190)
Argument Date: March 29,1993

ISSUE

The issue presented by this case is whether the United
States must pay state-imposed filing fees in general water
adjudications in which the extent of federal water rights are
to be decided. The United States claims that its surrender of
sovereign immunity allowing it to be made a party to those
water adjudications did not include a waiver of its sovereign
immunity with respect to filing fees.
FACTS

Unlike most water-rights controversies that reach the
United States Supreme Court, this one is relatively simple
and easy to understand. As part of its state water-rights
administration, the state of Idaho, like virtually all of the
western states, has devised a general adjudication procedure
that ascertains in a single proceeding all of the existing water
rights for the use of water from a particular water source. In
this case the water source is the Snake River in Idaho, one of
the great rivers of the West. In 1987, the United States, along
with more than 450,000 other potential claimants, was notified of the proceeding and invited to file its claims for adjudication. Failure by the United States to file and participate
in the proceeding would result in the loss of all its water
rights in that particular source.
By Idaho statute, water-rights claimants must pay a filing
fee before their "notice of claim" can be accepted for adjudication. Those fees are set by a schedule that is included in
the state statute. See Idaho Code § 42-1414 (1990). The collected fees are then segregated from other state revenues, and
are used "to pay for judicial expenses directly relating to the
Snake River adjudication." See Idaho Code §§ 42-1414 (3)
& 42-1777 (I) and (2). This is a non-trivial matter, as
Idaho's estimate of the cost of the proceeding is $32 million.
The United States is not the typical water-rights claimant
in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). It estimates
Robert H. Abrams is professor of law at Wayne State Law
School, Detroit, M148202; telephone (313) 577-3935.
314

that it will be required to pay in excess of $10 million in filing fees, fees that it feels are assessed on a basis that is
intended to discriminate against it and Indian tribes by charging substantially more for the filing of claims to instream
flow than for any other type of claim. Idaho rejects the claim
of bias in the fee schedule and further points out that while
the aggregate amount of fees that would be paid by the
United States seems high, the United States is making a myriad of claims for a vast amount of water. More specifically,
in all of its various capacities the United States is expected to
file more than 30,000 different claims, representing twelve
agencies. This computes out to a mere $330 per claim, for
water that will service more than 23 million acres of federal
land within the boundaries of the SRBA.
Procedurally, the case came to a head when the United
States refused to pay filing fees and the Idaho Director of
Water Resources refused to accept notices of claim filed by
the United States. The United States filed a petition with the
state district court seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the
director to accept the filings without the fees. The petition
was denied in an unreported decision, and that result was
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. By a divided vote (32) on March 30, 1992, the denial of the petition was
affirmed, leaving the United States under the obligation to
pay the filing fees or have its claims excluded from the
SRBA. See 832 P.2d 289. Certiorari was thereafter granted
by the United States Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

Like most sovereigns, the United States enjoys sovereign
immunity, which generally means that the United States cannot be sued without its consent. In the water-rights context,
the sovereign immunity of the United States historically prevented the several states from forcing the United States to
submit its water-rights claims for adjudication. As discussed
more fully below, this led to significant uncertainty regarding the extent of potential federal claims to water in the western states that might conflict with and displace claims to the
use of the same water by holders of state-law water rights.
Two short digressions about the American West may be
in order, one concerning state water law and the other concerning federal water rights. As part of the effort to allow the
states created out of the western lands to operate on an equal
footing with their eastern sister states, the western states
were assumed to have the power to make their own water
law insofar as so doing would not conflict with any federal
water rights. In the arid West, most of the states have adoptPREVIEW
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ed as their water law the doctrine of prior appropriation. At a
very simplistic level, that doctrine grants state-law based
water rights to persons who put the water to beneficial use on
the basis of priority in time as typified by the watchwords,
"First in time is first in right." What that means is that when
there is insufficient water in a stream to fulfill the water
rights of all of the users, the users who began their uses most
recently must stop their use entirely in order to allow the
more senior water users to receive their entire water right.
In marked contrast to the water rights created under state
law on the basis of historic levels of beneficial use of water,
stand a species of water rights called federal reserved water
rights. These rights have a complex origin rooted in history.
The federal government acquired virtually all of the West by
purchase or treaty, and subsequently disposed of much of that
land while retaining large tracts. The retained lands are divided into two general categories: lands that have been reserved
for a particular federal purpose, such as Indian reservations,
national parks, or the national forest system, and lands that
have not been reserved that are simply called the public
domain.
In the landmark case of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908), the Supreme Court explained that by implication
(rather than by actual beneficial use) federal water rights are
created when federally owned lands are withdrawn from the
public domain and reserved. The amount of water associated
with the reservation is that quantity necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the reservation. To coordinate these federal
reserved water rights with their state water-rights cousins, the
federal rights can arise only in water that was unappropriated
at the time the land was reserved from the public domain, and
the federal reserved rights carry a priority date of the time of
the reservation. For example, if land was reserved for a
national forest on January I, 1891, state-law appropriators
having senior (pre-1891) appropriative water rights are unaffected, but all post-reservation date state law appropriators are
junior to the federal water right.
There is significant potential for conflict in this system.
Federal reserved rights that are unquantified (i.e., it is uncertain how much water has been reserved) and often unused
(the right arises in virtue of reservation, not actual use) exist
throughout the West. Once quantified and put to use, these
federal reserved rights hold the potential to displace state-law
juniors in the event that there is not enough water for both the
federal use and the junior's use. As the use of water in the
West began to near or exceed reliable supply in many basins,
the cloud of federal reserved rights began to inhibit development by persons whose water rights would be junior to those
of the federal government. This state of affairs generated two
forms of uncertainty: (1) state-law juniors had no way of
knowing when, if at all, federal reserved water rights would
be put to use; and (2) they did not know just how much water
was covered by the federal reserved rights.
One way the states could overcome the latter ground of
uncertainty was to force the United States to have its water
rights quantified. The United States for a number of years
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invoked sovereign immunity when sued and thereby avoided
quantification. To counter that federal strategy, the western
states eventually persuaded Congress to enact the McCarran
amendment in 1952.
The McCarran amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (I) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water
of a river system or other source.... The United States, when
a party to any such suit, shall (I) be deemed to have waived
any right to plead that State laws are inapplicable or that the
United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) Shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and
decrees of the court having jurisdiction ... in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be
entered against the United States in any such suit."
As might be expected, the parties have devoted considerable time to arguments over the significanceof the "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances" and "no judgment for costs" phrases.
Previous McCarran amendment cases have already
defined the nature of proceedings that must be involved
before waiver of immunity will be found. See, e.g., Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), United States v. District Court for
Water Division No.5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971). Likewise, it
seems fairly clear that the United States, once a party to state
proceedings, is required to comply with relevant state procedures for the conduct of the litigation. See, e.g., United States
v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986). Thus, the precedential
value of this case seems likely to be limited to the context of
water-adjudication filing fees.
What is at stake is mostly money-lots of money by ordinary standards, and even a fair amount for agencies of the
federal government. Here, there is a sort of multiplier-if the
Idaho fee schedule is upheld, the other western states will be
sure to follow with their own filing-fee systems that collect
significant amounts of money from federal claimants in water
adjudications. For the states involved, the amounts involved
are likewise significant. If, as Idaho claims, the adjudication
will cost $32 million, a failure to recoup that money, or any
significant part of it, due to federal immunity will force the
state to allocate general revenues to pay for the adjudication.
Here, for example, if the $10 million anticipated filing fee
cannot be charged to the United States, Idaho must make up
that money from another source.
ARGUMENTS
For the United States (Counsel of Record, Kenneth W. Starr,
Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530; telephone (202) 633-2217):
l. The United States is immune from the requirement that it
pay "filing fees" to finance the state's costs in a general
water-rights adjudication.
2. The state must demonstrate that the waiver of immunity
of the McCarran amendment as it pertains to "filing fees"
is both clear and unambiguous.
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3. The McCarran amendment does not waive the United
States' immunity from assessment of filing fees in general
stream adjudications.

For the State of Idaho (Counsel of Record, Clive J. Strong,
Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,
Natural Resources Division, Statehouse, Room 210, Boise, ID
83720-1000; telephone (208) 334-2400):
I. The McCarran amendment does waive the United States'
immunity from assessment of filing fees in general stream
adjudications.
2. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
McCarran amendment as a sweeping waiver of federal
sovereign immunity.
3. The language and legislative history of the McCarran
amendment require the United States to comply with state
laws governing the conduct of general stream adjudications.
4. The Idaho filing fee at issue in this case is part of the
state's general stream adjudication laws and is within the
scope of the waiver of immunity.
5. The services financed by the filing fees collected by
Idaho benefit all claimants in the adjudication, including
the United States.
6. The assessment of a filing fee is not a forbidden "judgment for costs."
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AMICUS BRIEFS

In Support of United States
Nez Perce Tribe, Klamath Tribe, Tule River Tribe,
Klamath Allottee Water Users Association, and Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (Counsel of
Record, Robert T. Anderson, Native American Rights Fund,

310 K Street, STE 708, Anchorage, AK 99501; telephone
(907) 276-0680):
I. The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court undermines the
ability of Indian Tribes and the United States as trustee to
assert and defend tribal water rights in Idaho and other
western states.
2. Waivers of sovereign immunity are to be narrowly construed, especially when, as here, the rights of other sovereigns are affected.

In Support ofthe State ofIdaho
States of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming (Counsel

of Record, Virginia Linder, Solicitor General, State of
Oregon, 400 Justice Building, Salem, OR 97310; telephone
(503) 378-4402):
I. Judgments for costs are the only exception to the sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity worked by the passage
of the McCarran amendment.
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